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Digital Activism, Physical Activism
Malta’s Front Harsien ODZ
Michael Briguglio
Abstract: This article analyzes the interaction between the digital 
(online) and physical (offline) activism of Front Harsien ODZ, a 
Maltese environmental movement organization. It looks into how 
Front activists perceive these forms of activism and verifies how 
important each form is to the organization. Consequently, the 
research presented herein is operationalized through interviews 
with Front activists and through participant observation from an 
insider’s point of view. This article concludes that activists within 
Front Harsien ODZ feel that they are part of a social network. The 
organization’s recruitment, mobilization and activism techniques 
are at once digital and physical. Most Front activists were already 
part of preexisting social networks before joining the Front, and the 
new Front network made good use of Malta’s political opportunity 
structures, including the Zonqor controversy; Malta’s small size; 
and the country’s vibrant media landscape.
Keywords: activism, environmental movement, Malta, mobiliza-
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On 1 May 2015, Malta’s Prime Minister Joseph Muscat announced 
his government’s support of a new project—the American University 
of Malta. This project would entail the construction of a private uni-
versity managed by Jordanian investors on the Outside Development 
Zone (ODZ), a protected piece of land in Zonqor, Marsascala. A few 
days later, activists organized a public meeting to oppose the proposed 
develop ment, and consequently, a new citizens’ movement—Front 
 Harsien ODZ (Front of the Protection of ODZ)—was born. Its creation 
was then announced during a press conference in front of the Parlia-
ment of Malta.
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The Front subsequently held several meetings and press confer-
ences on this and other issues related to development on ODZ land. 
On 20 June 2015, it organized Malta’s biggest environmental protest 
with around three thousand to four thousand participants in Valletta, 
the capital city. The buildup and follow-up to these physical events 
were carried out through digital media, in terms of both internal com-
munication and the propagation of the Front’s goals and statements. 
The protest was advertised on Facebook, in the press, and on national 
television. The social networks of Front activists were crucial for com-
municating and setting up meetings with nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) and political parties.
Opposition toward the development on ODZ land in Zonqor was 
widespread. Following the protest, Front Harsien ODZ participated in 
meetings of Malta’s parliamentary environment committee and held 
other press conferences on the Zonqor issue. Subsequently, Muscat 
announced that the developed footprint of ODZ land at Zonqor would 
be substantially reduced and that the other part of the private university 
would be developed on a brownfield site in another locality, Bormla. 
Front Harsien ODZ noted its influence on the prime minister’s decision, 
yet it insisted that ODZ land should not be developed. In December 
2015, the parliament approved the transfer of public land in Zonqor and 
Bormla to the developers. The proposed development at Zonqor still 
requires processing through planning procedures in order to obtain the 
required development permits from Malta’s Planning Authority.
In this article, I analyze the relationship between the digital (online) 
and physical (offline) activism of the Front Harsien ODZ. Accordingly, I 
look at how Front activists perceive online activism and physical activ-
ism, and I attempt to examine the importance of internet tools for the 
organization. In this article, I aim to answer two main research ques-
tions. First, do Front activists form part of a social network and, if so, 
how? Second, how do online and offline activism influence the Front’s 
organization and mobilization? To answer these two research questions, 
I employ two principal methods. Specifically, I use interviews with Front 
activists and participant observation from an insider’s point of view. 
I draw on sociological literature on information communication tech-
nologies and movements, social networks, online mobilization, media 
performances, modular repertoires, media ecologies, media strategies, 
and networked social movements to analyze the role of digital media in 
environmental mobilization.
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Front Harsien ODZ in Context
Front Harsien ODZ was set up in 2015 in reaction to the Maltese gov-
ernment’s announcement of the development of a private university at 
Zonqor in Malta (Briguglio 2016a). Zonqor comprises ecologically sen-
sitive land in a coastal area situated in Malta’s ODZ. A few days after 
Muscat announced the American University of Malta project, environ-
mental activists organized a public meeting, which led to the creation of 
the Front. This new organization announced that its goals were purely 
environmental and that it welcomed support from all sectors of society. 
Its core activists comprised local councilors from the Labour, Nation-
alist, and Green parties; left, green, and environmental activists; and 
some newcomers. It was also endorsed by a wide range of organizations 
(Briguglio 2016a; Front Harsien ODZ 2018a).
The Front announced a national protest—#SaveZonqor—in Malta’s 
capital city, Valletta, which was preceded by a buildup of press confer-
ences, social media announcements, a commercial on state television, 
and internal and external meetings. The protest was held on 20 June 
2015, and it turned out to be Malta’s biggest environmental protest 
and one of Malta’s biggest protests with around three thousand to four 
thousand participants (Briguglio 2016a). Such crowds are usually only 
attracted when one of Malta’s two major parties or two major trade 
unions organize demonstrations.
Indeed, it should be noted that Malta is dominated by two major 
political parties—Labour and Nationalist—which have enjoyed exclusive 
parliamentary representation between 1962 and 2017. Their dominance 
can be seen in all aspects of life, and various civil society organiza-
tions and campaigns have involved the direct or indirect participation 
of both. These include Malta’s EU accession campaign between 1999 
and 2003, the divorce referendum in 2011, and the hunting referen-
dum in 2015 (Baldacchino and Wain 2013; Briguglio 2015b, 2016b). The 
two major political parties have also been dubbed “total institutions” 
( Baldacchino 2002), albeit now situated within multiple levels of gov-
ernance ( Baldacchino 2014). Hence, the participation of major political 
parties in environmental campaigns has been identified as a key factor 
for the success (or failure) of such campaigns (Briguglio 2013).
On 20 August 2015, Muscat announced that the developed footprint 
of ODZ land at Zonqor would be reduced by 80 percent to eighteen 
thousand square meters, and that the other part of the private univer-
sity would be developed in a former dockyard area previously occupied 
by warehouses and buildings constructed during Hospitaller rule and 
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under British rule. The Front was therefore partially victorious in its 
campaign to protect ODZ land in Zonqor, even though it said that it still 
disagreed with the government’s plans to have development on ODZ 
land (Briguglio 2013). In a way, the Front confirmed that the environ-
mentalist tradition in Malta, which dates back to the 1960s ( Boissevain 
and Gatt 2011; Briguglio 2015a), had now become an important element 
in Maltese politics. For instance, just a few weeks before the Front was 
established, Malta had held a referendum on a controversial environ-
mental issue—bird hunting in the spring. The pro-hunting lobby won 
by a very narrow majority, despite being opposed by only one small, 
nonparliamentary political party, the Green Party (Briguglio 2015b; 
 Veríssimo and Campbell 2015).
Front Harsien ODZ also confirmed the importance of digital media 
(Grech 2012; Martin 2016) alongside traditional media and physical pro-
test in the mobilization of support. Yet, the Front’s successful mobi-
lization also benefited from the fact that the organization included 
representatives from different political parties and was publicly sup-
ported by the leadership and the media wing of the opposition party in 
the parliament. Subsequent to the #SaveZonqor protest, Front Harsien 
ODZ became an established player in Malta’s environmental politics, 
regularly issuing press releases and participating in public consulta-
tions on environmental matters (Front Harsien ODZ 2018a). It captures 
regular press coverage, and its official Facebook page has close to five 
thousand followers (Front Harsien ODZ 2018b).
Research Methods
As mentioned earlier, this article aims to answer two main research 
questions. First, do Front activists form part of a social network and, 
if so, how? Second, how do online and offline activism influence the 
Front’s organization and mobilization? The main research method 
comprised interviews with Front activists. I am also a Front activist. 
Therefore, the analysis of such interviews also relies on and is aided by 
introspective participant observation from an insider’s point of view. 
Data was collected using semi-structured interviews with ten leading 
activists from Front Harsien ODZ. An email was sent to the Front’s inter-
nal activist Google Group, and once I reached a good number of volun-
teers, I proceeded with the interviews. Albeit small, the sample contains 
a high number of core members. Indeed, very frequently Front meetings 
had less than ten attendees (though some meetings had more). The 
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interviews were held a few months after the Front’s #SaveZonqor dem-
onstration in informal settings such as cafés, canteens, my university 
office, and activist meeting places.
I myself am a leading activist in this organization, and therefore I 
included my own introspective views in the course of the interviews 
and their analysis. Hence, in this research I occupy the positions of both 
social movement activist and sociologist. It should be acknowledged 
that there are arguments for and against such an introspective per-
spective in qualitative research. As an activist, I have privileged access 
to knowledge from fellow activists within social networks that would 
other wise be harder to obtain. On the other side, the disadvantages of 
such introspective methods include possible conflicts of interests or 
issues with the interpretation of the responses. For example, respon-
dents could decide to keep certain information confidential when reply-
ing to my questions. They could give very different responses to other 
interviewers. In addition, my role as a Front activist may lead me to 
overstate the organization’s role in Maltese society.
In response to such dilemmas, I would reply as follows. First, my 
views as activist and researcher do not necessarily tally with those of 
the respondents, especially because we come from different political 
and NGO backgrounds. Moreover, my role as Front activist has enabled 
me to be informed about the experiences of the organization’s activ-
ists, while my role as sociologist has enabled me to be reflexive in 
the interpretation of their responses (see Shaw 2013: 94). As it is the 
case with feminist standpoint methodology, my experiences should be 
valued in this research rather than seen as an obstacle, provided that 
I am responsible, accountable, and reflexive (Shaw 2013: 95). My role 
as an insider is ever more pronounced, given that Malta is a very small 
state characterized by a high degree of familiarity and public knowl-
edge. In this regard, Ronald Sultana and Godfrey Baldacchino (1994: 
16–17) state that in Malta
nearly every social relationship serves a variety of interests, and many 
roles are played by relatively few individuals. The same persons are 
thus brought into contact over and over again in various activities, 
because each operates and meets the other on the basis of different 
roles held in the context of different role-sets; decisions and choices 
are therefore influenced by the relationships which individuals estab-
lish and cultivate with others in a repertoire of diverse social settings. 
Impersonal, non-person specific, standards of efficiency, performance 
and integrity cannot therefore fail to come into play, modified by 
the myriad relationships brining the people concerned together . . . 
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And, given the absence of confidentiality and anonymity, inhabitants 
learn to manage intimacy: they get along, whether they like it or not, 
knowing that they are likely to renew and reinforce relationships with 
the same persons in a variety of settings over the course of a whole 
life span.
Jeremy Boissevain and Caroline Gatt (2011: 137) add that in Malta one 
finds a “woven mess of social relations that underpins most environ-
mentalist activism,” in which many activists occupy multiple roles. 
They occupy these roles in civil society, government, business, and 
academia.
I thus considered my own plurality of roles to be of benefit to this 
research. Respondents trusted me and could be open in their responses. 
I could verify the honesty of their claims and could interpret their 
responses through my sociological imagination. Our affinity through 
social networks may thus generate validity in this research. Importantly, 
I was also accountable to my respondents, as they could verify whether 
my questions were related to their experience and whether I was being 
fair and ethical. In addition, should I misquote them, I could immediately 
be identified by the respondents. The relationship between interviewer 
and interviewee is mutually regulated within a small-island context.
There was another major methodological ramification of Malta’s 
small size and intricate web of multiple relationships. The physical and 
digital dimensions of activism are even more strongly connected with 
each other in Malta, as online and offline communication are never too 
distant from each other. Activists might email each other in the morn-
ing, have a Front meeting in the afternoon, and follow this with a coffee 
in the evening. This would presumably be different from communica-
tion among activists who are separated by huge physical distances. In 
the latter case, online interaction may be more predominant.
Data and Analysis
Do Front Activists Form Part of a Social Network and, If So, How?
“I don’t feel like I’m a cog in a big machine.”
— Front activist
There were various commonalities and differences among the activists 
who were interviewed. Seven activists were over thirty-five years old, 
while four were younger, three of whom were under twenty-five years 
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old. Seven activists were male, and three were female and described 
themselves as “other.” Almost all activists had a high level of education. 
Five had tertiary qualifications, and three of these had PhDs. Two others 
were students, and all others held professional jobs in areas such as 
education, journalism, information technology (IT), and NGOs. When 
Front activists were asked questions regarding their sense of belonging 
to their organization, they expressed a sense of shared identity with 
other persons committed to the cause. One activist emphasized that 
within the organization “a small number of people, with different moti-
vations, are motivated. It is quite a feat that after recent environmental 
failures, the environmental movement has something supported by the 
media, by the people, a three-thousand-person protest.”
Another activist added that “Malta has never seen anything like it. It 
is a much more inclusive movement than anything we’ve ever done,” 
though he added some critical observations, saying that “there are cer-
tain nuances which we are not tackling: part of the problem is that we 
are not capitalizing on each and every individual’s resources.”
This was also evident in the fact that various activists had multiple 
and overlapping allegiances to different organizations. Indeed, practi-
cally all activists were involved in a movement, organization, political 
party, or campaign before joining Front Harsien ODZ. Four activists 
were or are involved in the leftist NGO Moviment Graffitti, three in the 
Green Party, and three in the Front against the Golf Course, the latter 
putting on a successful five-year campaign between 1999 and 2004. 
Other memberships included Friends of the Earth, major political par-
ties, and local councils. In this regard, it is important to note that “links 
founded on multiple allegiances are also important as they create chan-
nels of communication between movements and their environment” 
(Della Porta and Diani 2006: 126). As one activist put it, “different 
forces . . . are brought together under one umbrella.” Another activist 
added that “it is an interesting hybrid . . . people don’t have to go back 
to NGOs [for approval].”
In this regard, it is important to note that activists were very often 
connected through multiple memberships in more than one NGO and 
that some worked together in previous campaigns going back to the late 
1990s (Boissevain and Gatt 2011; Briguglio 1998, 2013; Galea 2011) and 
sometimes in political parties. NGOs such as Moviment Graffitti, which 
announced the first public meeting that subsequently led to the set-
ting of the Front, were used to working with the Green Party and often 
denounced the two major parties in Malta, Labour and  Nationalist. 
Sometimes, this led to environmental coalitions involving a wide range 
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of NGOs (Briguglio 2013). However, a main difference in the Front 
Harsien ODZ was that it operated under a steady Labour government, 
whereas most environmental activism had previously been carried out 
under Nationalist administrations, which were in power between 1987 
and 1996 and between 1998 and 2013. Some other Front activists were 
newcomers, and others hailed from the Nationalist and Labour parties, 
respectively, most notable among which were two local councilors from 
Marsascala, where Zonqor is situated.
When asked about their ideological orientations, seven activists 
responded “left,” which was the most common answer, and four activ-
ists responded “Green.” There were also some other replies, includ-
ing those that emphasized lifestyle rather than political ideology. Most 
respondents also felt that they shared strong ideological affinities with 
other activists in the Front. When asked about the aims of the Front 
itself, most activists referred to protection of the ODZ, followed by the 
environment in general. Some individual respondents also referred 
to the party’s anticapitalist position and stance against political party 
financing, “as otherwise it is useless fighting on individual cases.” On 
the other hand, the Front Harsien ODZ (2018a) officially describes itself 
as follows: “Front Harsien ODZ is a citizens’ movement which welcomes 
support from all sectors of society. The goals of this Front are purely 
environmental.” It is interesting to note that various Front respondents 
had common reactions concerning people whom they would not expect 
to join the organization. Seven respondents referred to developers, exec-
utives, and Sandro Chetcuti, a media-savvy developer who cofounded 
the Malta Developers Association. Three respondents referred to fascists 
and nonenvironmentalists, while two referred to “party satellites.” On 
the other hand, some activists noted that parties and NGOs could ben-
efit from each other, as “they are using us, we are using them . . . after 
all political parties are part of the democratic process, too.”
Front activists were also asked about how they joined the organiza-
tion. Two respondents said that they were co-organizers who came up 
with the original idea to combat the proposed development at Zonqor. 
Six others said that they were contacted either by organizers or through 
their respective NGOs. Indeed, the first public meeting on the Zonqor 
issue, which was organized by Moviment Graffitti, attracted around 
eighty people, including some whom, in the words of an activist, “I 
didn’t imagine I would work with.”
Some of these activists—six out of eleven respondents—learned about 
the Front through Facebook. Nine respondents felt that the internet was 
important for their respective memberships, even though all respondents 
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knew other activists in the Front. In the words of one activist: “Without 
the internet I wouldn’t have joined the front. . . . I can’t remember what 
we used to do before the internet existed.” It is important to point out 
that one important aspect of digital media is that it can function as a 
social network. In the case of civil society activism, digital media may 
enable individuals to feel part of a collective will, which is committed to 
a specific cause. This will, or identity, may be defined in terms of a “we” 
in opposition to a “them” (Gamson 1992; Mouffe 2005). Such a social 
network need not be reduced to digital media or physical social links. 
Indeed, the two may overlap and create different forms of social capital 
such as trust and participation (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 129), as well 
as negotiation and decision making (Melucci 1995: 45). They may also 
replicate each other. In this regard, Javier Sajuria and colleagues (2015) 
refer to the replication of offline social characteristics such as homophily 
and the exclusion of nonmembers.
These results also support the idea that important determinants of 
such social networks may include a preexisting commitment to specific 
causes as well as multiple ties and allegiances. The latter determinant 
may include personal contacts, membership in specific social movement 
organizations, and shared and overlapping memberships among differ-
ent individuals (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 118–129). Melucci consid-
ers identity in such social networks as being open-ended, dynamic, 
and diverse, and believes that the term should rather be referred to 
as “identization” (1996: 77). Hence, once again, the conceptualization 
of collective action through social networks should be seen as being 
overdetermined by different factors. In other words, collective action 
emerges in “interconnected and overlapping texts and conversations 
that unfold in conversation sites with varying spatialities and temporali-
ties in which people come together to coordinate and act collectively” 
(Kavada 2015: 876).
How Do Online and Offline Activism Influence the Front’s 
Organization and Mobilization?
Front activists were asked about the organization’s activism and how 
they relate to it. Results show that activism was at once online and 
offline, thus forming a hybrid which was immersed in the “hybrid 
world” of the contemporary network society (Castells 2012 232). All 
Front activists use Facebook, and most also use Twitter. The Front itself 
has its own Facebook community page and website, though Facebook 
is used the most: the Front has a community of almost five thousand 
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followers. Internally, Front members communicate through a Google 
Groups email community and occasional face-to-face meetings.
Information and communication technologies (ICTs) are consid-
ered to be very important by Front activists. Through the interviews, it 
turned out that they facilitate immediate communication, access, social 
outreach, and various operations. In this regard, it is important to note 
that Malta has the second highest use of social media in the European 
Union, where more than 80 percent of the population aged between 16 
and 74 are active on social media (Caruana 2017). At the same time, 
activists were also wary of perceived drawbacks such as a false sense of 
engagement and a false sense of progress. As one activist put it, 
I believe that protests and the greatest amount of change can happen 
when people take it out in the streets . . . Change happens when you 
have concerted action. Change happens when you have politicians 
who can see people resisting . . . I think one of the major drawbacks 
of ICT is that it has fueled a sense of self-illusion . . . people believing 
they are contributing to dramatic change when they are simply online 
conversationalists.
In relation to such findings, sociological literature on ICTs and social 
movements emphasizes various potential impacts of the former on 
the latter’s outcomes. As early as 1996, Alberto Melucci posed new 
questions on the impact of ICTs on “processes of mobilization, organi-
zational forms, models of leadership, ideologies and forms of commu-
nications” (1996: 4).
ICTs are said to bring about better coordination and more social 
access, and extend the outreach of movement communications. This can 
result in increased connectivity between movements, better mobilization 
for movement campaigns, and increased political leverage. At the same 
time, however, such impacts are not guaranteed and can sometimes have 
adverse outcomes such as information overload and the reproduction of 
hierarchies among movement activists (Flesher Fominaya 2014: 127–135; 
2016). It is important to note that ICTs such as digital media are being 
considered to be embedded within social networks, thus resulting in the 
hybridization of online and offline practices, including those of social 
movements (Castells 2012; Pavan 2014). Thus, digital media “facilitate 
a constructive crossing between different organizational practices, some 
of which are established offline (e.g., coordination meetings in head-
quarters), others online (e.g., the supply of donations through PayPal), 
and still others cross-dimensionally (e.g., when a demonstration is orga-
nized via Facebook events)” (Pavan 2014: 446). Within this new social 
Digital Activism, Physical Activism | 59
context, digital media cannot simply be reduced to an instrument used 
by activists; it must be seen as a contributor to the contemporary context 
of cultural production and consumption. Digital media itself is therefore 
a site of “political demonstration, negotiation and activism” (Shah 2013: 
666). This is not to say that social analysis should resort to techno-
logical determinism. Digital media is overdetermined (Althusser 1977; 
Laclau and Mouffe 1985) within historical, social, and cultural contexts, 
and within concrete political situations and struggles ( Bakardjieva 2015: 
989), which, for example in Malta’s case, include the strong presence 
of political parties and the country’s small size. As Cristina Flesher 
 Fominaya puts it, “the best approaches recognize the complexity of new 
media ecologies, in which online and offline media forms interact, and 
in which social movement actors engage in crucial face-to-face inter-
actions with one another, as well as virtually” (2014: 147).
Flesher Fominaya (2014: 127–135) adds that ICTs need to be used stra-
tegically, as they do not necessarily guarantee success. Indeed, respon-
dents in this study expressed mixed views on whether the internet was 
important for the recruitment of activists. One respondent said: “Some 
people just subscribe and put likes on Facebook. I don’t consider them. 
One out of every two hundred people decides to do something, but it’s 
minimal.” But another respondent said that “many of our activists are 
not the type to do door-to-door campaigning,” thus acknowledging the 
important role of recruitment through the internet. In other words:
It has been totally instrumental and absolutely necessary. Without the 
internet, we wouldn’t have been able to market, promote or frame 
what we are doing to the general public . . . we managed to create a 
sense of identity and belonging amongst people who had been pissed 
off for years to actually feel a part of something, to feel a part of a 
movement, and I think this has made history in itself.
Another respondent said that “it is as if the protest is already being 
held before it is actually held.” ICTs compress time and space, and the 
protest in the streets is not a singular event, but part of a repertoire, an 
ongoing campaign. Respondents agreed that the communicating poten-
tial and sense of immediacy brought about through ICTs is important 
for the Front’s identity. Thus, “what we are saying is being presented 
precisely, and people can comment. . . . It is a call which reverberates 
more, especially when politics is now more sensitive to the media.”
Front activists therefore tend to confirm the cyberoptimistic view 
that social media can enable social movements to create their own 
media, for example through online videos, memes, and slogans. These 
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important additions to the “tactical toolbox of the modular social move-
ment repertoire” may also include “5 minute activism” (Johnston 2014: 
142) such as online petitions, email campaigns, and shared campaign 
updates. Social media can therefore be seen as a stage on which poli-
tics may be performed (Hendriks et al. 2016: 1120) and where counter-
narratives to official stories may be produced (Flesher Fominaya 2014: 
123). Potentially, this may capture the attention of the mainstream 
media. Social media forms part of the broader media landscape, and its 
presence within it is key to exerting influence. Indeed, the media may 
be  considered being “indirect brokers in influencing politicians and the 
public” (Johnston 2014: 95).
In this regard, social movements may resort to particular perfor-
mances to capture media coverage and analysis. Sometimes, these may 
need to be dramatic and to take place in specific locations. For example, 
protests in cities may win more media coverage than in small towns: 
despite Malta’s small size, the choice of the capital city, Valletta, for 
the Front’s protest proved to be an excellent tactical choice. Besides, 
there may be multiple media portrayals and analyses of social move-
ment activism (Johnston 2014: 95–96). These may include coverage by 
different media forms, such as the mass media and alternative media, 
coverage affected by media bias, and coverage affected by the relative 
resources and power of different social movements and their adversaries 
(Flesher Fominaya 2014: 119–120).
Respondents also confirmed that Front Harsien ODZ engages within 
both social media and the mass media, and respondents consider the 
latter important in terms of coverage, legitimacy, and giving credi-
bility to the Front. Hence, online mobilization is an important factor 
for collective action. Indeed, results from this research support Alison 
Dahl Crossley’s view that Facebook “is a unique infrastructure for 
mobilization and recruitment” (2015: 263). Together with other social 
media tools such as Twitter, Facebook can be used to promote ideas 
and events, to communicate with activists and supporters, to recruit 
new activists, to build identities, to collect funds, and to mobilize the 
public (Hestres 2014, 2015; Mercea 2012). Such social media tools also 
enhance reflexivity within social movements and can thus be dubbed 
“technologies of self-mediation” (Cammaerts 2015: 98), where online 
crowds come together (Gerbaudo 2015: 920) and perform acts of digital 
solidarity (Stalder 2013).
The immediacy of such social media tools may facilitate interaction 
both within online communication and between online and offline forms 
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of communication. Thus, one “does not need to be a card- carrying and 
meeting-attending party or association member in order to act on the 
public stage” (Bakardjieva 2015: 985). Therefore, the impact of the inter-
net in general and social media in particular is that they may reinforce 
existing activist networks by facilitating communication, and they may 
also expand networks by reaching out to new and potential partici-
pants in collective action (van Laer 2010: 349–350). However, whether 
the latter results in long-term commitment is not clear (361). At the 
same time, however, online activism may have its shortcomings. Jeroen 
van Laer (2010: 347), for example, suggests that online communication 
networks may end up perpetuating inequalities among activists, espe-
cially since “superactivists” might be more predisposed to participate 
in different forms of activism. Online activism and communication may 
also impact the dynamics of face-to-face groups such as their meetings 
(Flesher Fominaya 2016). Moreover, diverse perspectives may become 
more embedded in their respective positions rather than engage with 
others (Hendriks et al. 2016: 1120–1121).
This is not to say that offline networks apart from activist networks 
are not important. Indeed, some activists consider offline networks as 
having an important social function and as being more important than 
online activist networks. In a small island society like Malta, such net-
works may be especially important because of geographical proximity, 
shared community spaces, and common biographical experiences. One 
activist said that his seventy-eight-year-old father participated in the 
#SaveZonqor protest through offline networks. Some activists empha-
sized that many of them knew each other before forming the Front. They 
were not only active together, but they also shared common experiences 
like hanging out in certain bars and at certain cultural events. Face-to-
face interaction is a key element of the Front’s social makeup. Some 
activists added that offline networks can be used better—for example, 
to recruit local residents—and that online networks can become heavy-
handed if used too much.
Therefore, all respondents consider both online and offline networks 
to be important, especially when used together. On the one hand, “the 
Front wouldn’t exist without Facebook. If it existed, nobody would 
know of it.” On the other hand, “it is important to inform, but you 
need to get down on the streets . . . the Front managed to do both.” One 
activist summed things up neatly by concluding that “one of the nice 
things in the Front is that it permits different levels of activism; there is 
no military discipline.”
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Discussion
This article shows that activists within Front Harsien ODZ feel like they 
are part of a social network. The Front was originally formed by activists 
who were united in their opposition to the development of the Ameri-
can University of Malta on ODZ land in Zonqor. But the organization 
quickly grew into something broader, dealing with ODZ development 
in general and incorporating activists from different political party and 
social movement backgrounds. The plurality of activist backgrounds 
enabled the Front to network and reach out to various social, political, 
and media circles.
Despite their diverse backgrounds, Front activists shared commonali-
ties. These included their high levels of education, and their leftward/
greenward orientation on the Maltese political compass. Activists shared 
a sense of collective identity with other activists in the organization, 
and this was further pronounced by the fact that many had multiple 
and overlapping allegiances to different organizations and campaigns. 
Some activists interviewed in this research were co-organizers of the 
first public meeting, which eventually led to the creation of the Front in 
subsequent meetings. But most activists were recruited after being con-
tacted either by organizers or by their respective NGOs. Facebook also 
played a strong role in the recruitment of activists. Most importantly, all 
activists knew other activists before the Front existed.
Preexisting social networks and preexisting commitments to other 
causes played a very important role in the formation of Front Harsien 
ODZ, as was the case with other social movement organizations (Della 
Porta and Diani 2006: 118–129). Given Malta’s small size, physical 
social links were very strong, but digital media usage overlapped with 
them in the development of participation and the formation of trust. It 
would therefore not be wise to reduce social network analysis to either 
digital or physical activism (129). In this regard, activists felt part of 
both a social network and an environmentalist category, thus falling in 
line with Charles Tilly’s (1978: 63) classic notion of cat-net (a network 
within a category), which assumes two decisive factors in the mobiliza-
tion of protest participants, namely, network ties and the presence of 
a sense of belonging to a certain category of people. In the process, a 
“we” identity was formed in opposition to a “them” identity (e.g., big 
developers) (Gamson 1992; Mouffe 2005).
With regard to the influence of online and offline activism on the 
Front’s organization and mobilization, this article shows that Front 
 Harsien ODZ is at once immersed in both digital and physical activism. 
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The fact that Front activists feel that they are part of a social net-
work and the fact of Malta’s small size are two very important factors 
embedded in the modular repertoire of Front Harsien ODZ. Immediacy 
is present not only online but also offline, given the physical proxim-
ity of activists and their preexisting social networks. This opportunity 
structure might not be otherwise available in larger societies, where 
physical activism and networking may be hindered by greater physical 
distances among activists and prospective participants in public events, 
which may include protesters but also include journalists and  meeting 
 attendees. Hence, Front activists interact with each other and with 
 possible new activists both through face-to-face meetings and through 
“technologies of self-mediation” (Cammaerts 2015: 98) such as email 
and Facebook.
This hybrid context is also evident in the Front’s interaction with 
the media. As discussed earlier, Front Harsien ODZ and its activists 
make regular use of social media tools such as Facebook for outreach, 
propagation, and recruitment, but the organization is also visible in the 
mainstream printed and online Maltese media through its press state-
ments and its events. For instance, when Front Harsien ODZ decided 
to organize the #SaveZonqor protest, it did so in a face-to-face internal 
meeting that was followed up by press conferences, email communica-
tions with civil society, face-to-face interaction with prospective par-
ticipants, face-to-face meetings with other organizations including the 
parliamentary opposition party, social media announcements and ads, 
a television commercial, participation in radio and television programs, 
and other similar means of getting the word out. In turn, these digital 
and physical forms of mobilization had their own snowball effects. For 
example, individual NGOs supporting the protest informed their mem-
bers, and the parliamentary opposition Nationalist Party announced its 
participation and rallied for the protest through its own media appara-
tus, which included a daily newspaper, online news, a television sta-
tion, and a radio station. Hence, the “tactical toolbox of the modular 
social movement repertoire” (Johnston 2014: 142) varied from instant 
activism such as the sharing of Front communication on social media, 
to participation in the #SaveZonqor protest, to recruitment within 
Front Harsien ODZ itself. Indeed, the Front’s activism was very much 
in line with Flesher Fominaya’s (2014: 147) definition of “new media 
ecologies.”
This research also falls within the theoretical infrastructure for the 
conceptualization of networked social movements and their relation to 
power. The latter is neither determined by structural power, nor simply 
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a product of agency. Social movements are reflective agents of change, 
and the media may be a source of power if movement networks are 
influential. Manuel Castells’s theory of power is very useful in this 
regard. Referring to movements such as the Indignados Movement in 
Spain, he conceptualizes power as being embedded in the institutions of 
society, particularly the state, but also as being subject to counterpower, 
which is “the capacity of social actors to challenge the power embedded 
in the institutions of society for the purpose of claiming representation 
for their own values and interests” (2012: 5). He then goes on to argue 
that “all institutional systems reflect power relations, as well as limits 
to these power relations as negotiated by an endless historical process 
of conflict and bargaining.” Social movements’ occupation of internet 
social networks and urban space can create “instant communities of 
transformative practice” (11) and the collective construction of mean-
ings (Castells 2011). Such practice is at once local and global, as it starts 
in specific contexts but is connected on the internet, and social move-
ments are inspired by others along the way (Castells 2012: 222).
Despite the influence of ICTs on the Front’s activism, one could ques-
tion whether this could be compared with instances offline mobiliza-
tion. The analysis of three earlier case studies shows different outcomes. 
The Front against Hilton in the late 1990s, which did not rely on the 
internet and made use of nonviolent direct action as well as public 
outreach, alliances, and mainstream media coverage, did not stop the 
development from taking place but led to a legislative change which 
ensured more transparency (Briguglio 1998). The Front against the Golf 
Course—which, at the turn of the twenty-first century, relied on Web 1.0 
together with public outreach, alliances, and mainstream media cover-
age—was successful in stopping the development of the course (Galea 
2011). On the other hand, a broad coalition against  Malta’s land rational-
ization process made use of Web 1.0 and mainstream media coverage, 
but was unsuccessful in stopping the planning process (Briguglio 2012). 
The Front against the Golf Course differed from the other two move-
ments in that it enjoyed greater active support from the then Labour 
opposition and from some voices within the then Nationalist govern-
ment. Its strategy was also very inclusive of different frames and voices 
across the political and societal spectrum (Galea 2011).
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Conclusion
This article shows how Front Harsien ODZ is characterized by both 
online and offline activism. Its social networks, recruitment and mobi-
lization strategies, and activism are at once digital and physical. Most 
Front activists were already part of preexisting social networks before 
joining the Front, and the new Front network made good use of  Malta’s 
political opportunity structures, including the Zonqor controversy, 
 Malta’s small size, and a vibrant media landscape.
Within this context, the activists interviewed in this study are exam-
ples of reflective agents of change who have been capable of creating 
“instant communities of transformative practice” (Castells 2012: 11) and 
the collective construction of meanings (Castells 2011). This is not to 
say that they will necessarily have the same impact on future protests, 
or that all similar digital/physical activism will be successful. Indeed, 
there are many examples of unsuccessful activism and mobilization 
which involve ICTs (Earl and Kimport 2011; Tufekci 2014). Whether the 
Front’s massive mobilization for its #SaveZonqor protest was success-
ful in terms of outcomes is in itself subject to debate. Its activism has 
indeed “saved” Zonqor from 80 percent of the proposed footprint of the 
development. However, as it now stands, the remaining 20 percent will 
still be developed.
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